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Abstract: This paper offers an empirical test of the effect of the mortgage
interest deduction (MID) on both the extensive (own vs. rent) and intensive
(size of home) housing purchase margins. Using state level differences in MID
availability to identify, I examine this relationship using standard ordinary
least squares, instrumental variables, regression discontinuity, and sample
selection estimation techniques. I find the MID to be responsible for a 10.9–
18.4% increase in the size of home purchased, but that no relationship exists
between the MID and home ownership. These results imply an elasticity of
home size with respect to changes in user cost between −1 and −1.4.

1. Introduction
The mortgage interest deduction (MID,) will reduce income tax
revenues by more than $98 billion in fiscal year 2012 (Executive Office
of The President, 2011). A major criticism of this tax expenditure, and
of the MID as a policy in general, is that it encourages excessive
purchase of housing.1 Using parameterized theoretical models, Mills,
1987 and Poterba, 1992 suggest the tax favored2 status of housing
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causes a 12–24% increase in housing consumption (or overinvestment relative to other assets in the context of the user cost
model).3 Although these theoretical models are parameterized using
real values for important determinants of the housing purchase choice,
they do not offer direct evidence that the MID effects housing
purchase decisions. Existing empirical work offers little precise
evidence that directly links the MID to the amount of housing
purchase.4
This paper offers an empirical test of how the MID effects
housing purchase on both the extensive (own vs. rent) and intensive
(size of home) margins. I use state-level differences in the availability
of the MID to identify how the MID effects housing purchase
decisions.5 Using state level policy as a basis, I compare housing
purchase decisions for residents of states with an MID to several
control groups where the MID is not available at the state level. I also
employ several estimation techniques to identify the effect of the MID
on housing purchase decisions – ordinary least squares, instrumental
variables, and regression discontinuity.
Using dwelling level data from the American Housing Survey
(AHS) on owner occupied homes, estimates show that the MID is
responsible for a 10.9–18.4% increase in the size of home purchased
(statistically significant in nearly all cases), depending on the
econometric specification and comparison group. This result is robust
to instrumental variables estimation, using states that take the federal
definition of itemized deductions as an instrument for a state level
MID. Estimates show a smaller, but still meaningful relationship
between home size and the MID using regression discontinuity
estimation with census tract level data. Estimates show no statistically
significant relationship between the MID and the probability a home is
owner occupied in most cases, although in some cases I find a
negative relationship.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses the theoretical relationship between the MID,
homeownership, and size of home purchase. Section 3 describes how
this work fits into the previous literature. Section 4 outlines the
identification strategy for estimating the relationship between the MID
and housing purchase. Section 5 discusses the data for estimation.
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Section 6 reports results using my primary identification strategy and
alternative identification strategies. Section 7 concludes.

2. Theoretical considerations for the relationship
between the MID and housing
The standard model used to study the tax treatment of owner
occupied housing is the user cost model. See Rosen, 1979a, Rosen,
1979b, Rosen, 1985, Poterba, 1984, Poterba, 1992, Green and
Vandell, 1999, Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003 and Himmelberg et al., 2005
and Anderson et al. (2007) for variations of this model. The user cost
model is useful for understanding how the presence of a MID and
changing marginal tax rates effect both the purchase price and annual
cost of home ownership. The user cost model, however, offers limited
insight on the margin where the MID begins to subsidize housing
purchase, and the joint effects of reduced income and changing
relative price caused by income tax rate changes.
To examine how the MID effects housing purchase decisions,
consider its impact on a consumer budget constraint, depicted in Fig.
1. Fig. 1 shows a budget constraint for a consumer considering the
trade-off between owner occupied housing and all other goods. The
dotted line shows the budget constraint without the MID, and the solid
line shows how the MID changes the budget constraint. A budget
constraint with the MID differs from the standard budget constraint in
two important ways – it creates a “kink” point, and it makes
consuming additional housing cheaper beyond this point.
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Fig. 1. Consumer budget constraint with mortgage interest deduction.

The kink point exists because the MID is not available until a
home owner itemizes deductions on their tax return. A home owner
will not itemize deductions until the sum of those deductions is greater
than the standard deduction. Therefore, the MID does not begin to
change the relative price of owner occupied housing until the amount
of mortgage interest exceeds the difference between the standard
deduction and all other itemized deductions. In equation form, the MID
begins to subsidize the purchase of owner occupied housing when:

𝑖𝜃𝑃𝐻 = 𝑆𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 − ∑ 𝐼𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡
(1)
where i is the interest rate on a mortgage, θ is the share of the home
purchase financed with debt, and PH is the full purchase price of the
home. SDeduct represents the amount of standard deduction allowed
without itemizing, and IOtherDeduct are amounts of all other deductions
allowed for itemizers.
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After the point where a consumer purchases enough owner occupied
housing so that the mortgage interest covers the difference between
all other itemized deductions and the standard deduction, the MID
lowers the relative price of additional housing, flattening the budget
constraint. For this segment of the budget constraint, the income and
substitution effects work together – encouraging consumers to
purchase more owner occupied housing. Fig. 1 shows why the MID
does not necessarily subsidize owner occupied housing on the
extensive margin (moving from renting to owning), but subsidizes
owner occupied housing on the intensive margin (purchasing a larger
home). This is one explanation why previous evidence suggests no
relationship between federal itemization rates and home ownership
rates (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003).
While Fig. 1 shows how implementing a MID effects the
consumer’s budget constraint, it does not consider the effect of an
income tax directly (a necessary condition for the presence of the
MID). Fig. 2 shows how increasing the marginal income tax rate and
allowing an MID affect the consumer’s budget constraint. The presence
of an income tax with an MID changes the budget constraint in two
ways – shifting it in closer to the origin at all points and flattening it
out for all points where the amount of mortgage interest exceeds the
difference between the standard deduction and all other itemized
deductions.
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Fig. 2. Consumer budget constraint with higher marginal tax rate and
mortgage interest deduction.

Fig. 2 shows why it is inappropriate to use only individual
variation in the income tax rate to assess the effect of the MID on
housing market outcomes, and why it is necessary to control for the
marginal tax rate when assessing the effect of the MID. The first order
effect of higher marginal tax rates is to shift the budget constraint
toward the origin – causing a reduction in consumption of housing and
all other goods. The second order effect of the higher marginal tax rate
is to flatten the portion of the budget constraint for housing
consumption greater than the kink point – where both the income and
substitution effects say to consume more housing (relative to the case
with no MID). Fig. 2 shows that comparing consumers with different
marginal tax rates to identify the effect of the MID can be misleading
because of the confounding effects of the income reduction, and
suggests that estimates of the effect of the MID should control for the
negative income effect of higher marginal tax rates when examining
the effect of the MID.
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3. Previous studies of the relationship between
the MID and housing
There have been a number of previous studies attempting to
determine the link between home ownership and the MID. Rosen and
Rosen (1980) estimate a model using time series variation to predict
that the national home ownership rate would be 4% points lower
without a MID. Hendershott and Schilling (1982) provide slightly
higher estimates in the range of 5–6.5%, depending on the assumed
average marginal income tax rate. Linneman (1985) uses proxies for
marginal tax rates to show that tax treatment of housing is an
important determinant of homeownership in a cross section of cities.6
More recently, Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) estimate the relationship
between the average subsidy created by the MID and home ownership
rates using quarterly national time series data and a cross section of
state level data. They find an extremely small positive relationship
between the subsidy created by the MID and homeownership rates in
some specifications, but on balance their results show no relationship
between home ownership and the MID.
There is a smaller literature that links the MID to demand for
mortgage debt. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances,
Follain and Dunsky (1997) show that the demand for mortgage debt is
highly responsive to changes in the income tax rate that applies to the
MID. They find that the elasticity of mortgage debt with respect to an
income tax rate change is between −1.5 and −3.5 depending on the
year of data used in estimation. Using data from the American Housing
Survey, Ling and McGill (1998) show the rate of tax savings on
mortgage interest is a significant determinant of the amount of
mortgage debt. They find that owners with a lower average rate of tax
savings (measured by the amount of housing related deductions that
potentially go unused) from the MID have significantly lower demand
for mortgage debt.
In addition to studies that directly estimate the effect of the MID
on home ownership decisions and the demand for mortgage debt,
there is a literature that examines the interaction between both real
and proposed policy and the value of the MID. Rosen (1979a)
estimates a model to show without the MID, residents would live in
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homes that are less valuable. Follain and Ling (1991) show that the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 made the MID essentially worthless for many
households with low incomes. Poterba (1992) also analyzed the
distribution of the MID before and after TRA86, finding a similar result.
Green and Vandell (1999) examine a hypothetical revenue-neutral
switch from the current MID and property tax deduction to a housing
tax credit. Anderson and Roy (2001) examine the impact for taxpayers
across the income distribution of removing both the mortgage interest
and property tax deductions. Anderson et al. (2007) examine the
differential effect of proposals to impose limits on federal mortgage
interest deductibility across metropolitan areas. Bourassa and Yin
(2007) also examine MID limits and show they would have an
especially negative impact on ownership decisions for young residents
of urban areas.
This paper makes four contributions to the previous literature.
First, in addition to estimating the relationship between the MID and
homeownership, I estimate the relationship between the MID and the
amount of housing consumed (measured in square feet). Second, I
improve upon the data used to estimate the effect of the MID on
homeownership by using dwelling-level micro data. Third, I use cross
section variation created by differences in state-level MID policy and
control for the top marginal tax rate to eliminate the income effects of
higher marginal tax rates. Lastly, I use both instrumental variables
and regression discontinuity to estimate this relationship.

4. Identification strategy
The federal MID is available to all income taxpayers who itemize
deductions, however, not all states have an income tax and not all
states that have an income tax allow an MID. I use the cross section
variation in MID availability for state income tax purposes to identify
how it effects both the homeownership decision and the size of home
purchased.7 First, I use policy variation across all states to estimate
the effect of the MID on home size and ownership. Estimates of this
relationship compare homes in states with the MID against a variety of
comparison groups; all other states, all other income tax states, and
all states with a top marginal income tax above the median. Then, I
estimate the effect of the MID on home size and ownership using the
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policy difference on either side of a state border where one state
allows the MID and the other does not in a regression discontinuity
framework.
The use of state-level policy variation as opposed to the actual
choice to claim the MID is advantageous for two reasons. The first is
that a data source containing both actual tax information and detailed
home purchase decisions does not exist. The second is an econometric
issue. An individual’s decision to claim the MID is likely to be a
function of several other factors: level of education, income, the
presence of dependents (i.e. children), and availability of other
deductions. Many of these factors are also likely to be directly linked to
housing purchase decisions, immediately raising endogeneity
concerns. State level availability of the MID is arguably exogenous at
the individual level, or is at least not highly correlated with other
individual characteristics that drive housing purchase decisions. 8

4.1. Comparison of state-level policies
To identify the effect of the MID on home size and ownership I
estimate the following regression:

𝛾𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (MID)𝑖 + 𝛽2 (Top MTR)𝑖 + 𝛧𝑖ˊ 𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖
(2)
where Y is either the size of the home measured in square feet, or an
indicator variable equal to one if the home is owner occupied and
equal to zero otherwise. MID is a variable equal to one if the home is
in a state that allows the mortgage interest deduction and zero if it
does not. Top MTR is the top marginal state income tax rate. The
income tax burden is an important control because the MID is a
feature of states that have an income tax, and the first order effect of
an income tax is lower income, which lowers demand for housing.9
Without controlling for the income tax rate, Eq. (2) would likely be
biased toward underestimating the effect of the MID on housing
market outcomes.10Z is a set of control variables that includes the age
in years and age-squared of the housing unit, a dummy variable
indicating if it is a single family residence, the annual maintenance
costs per square foot, price per square foot, age (in years) of the
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household head, age of household head squared, a variable indicating
if the household head is non-white, annual household income, an
indicator if the house is located in the central city of a metropolitan
area, the mortgage interest rate, and census region dummy variables.
I also estimate Eq. (2) using controls for the year the current owner
moved into the home in some specifications.
When the dependent variable in Eq. (2) is square footage of the
home, the coefficient of interest (β1) is interpreted as the marginal
effect of an MID on the size of home purchased. When the dependent
variable in Eq. (2) is an indicator of the home being owner occupied,
the coefficient of interest (β1) is interpreted as how the MID changes
the probability of home ownership. Because of concerns with
correlation between Z and the MID variable, I estimate Eq. (2) with
and without control variables to eliminate concerns that bad control
variable bias drives my results. The results section discusses concerns
with comparison group viability and endogeneity in estimating (2).

4.2. Regression discontinuity
The abrupt change in mortgage interest deductibility that
happens at a state border makes a regression discontinuity method
attractive to identify the effect of the subsidy on outcomes of interest.
If the mortgage interest deduction affects housing market outcomes,
then we would expect to see a sharp change in outcomes on either
side of a border between two states with differing MID policy. Using
the border between Pennsylvania and Maryland, known as the Mason–
Dixon Line (MDL), is ideal for regression discontinuity for several
reasons.
First, this border is not the result of geological features like a
river or mountains that could impede building a home.11 Second, the
border is between two states with similar income tax rates going back
for several years. Similar income tax rates are necessary to avoid
picking up income effects from the difference in tax rates. Lastly,
Pennsylvania has never allowed a MID going back to when the income
tax was implemented in 1971,12 and Maryland has allowed a MID at
going back as far as when the state income tax began being collected
in 1939.13

Journal of Housing Economics, Vol 21, No. 3 (2012): pg. 195-210. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

10

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

In practice, regression discontinuity requires regressions of the
following form:

𝐻𝑖 = 𝛼𝑃𝐴 + 𝛽1 (Distance to MDL)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , where: 0
< Distance to MDL < ℎ
(3)
And

𝐻𝑖 = 𝛼𝑀𝐷 + 𝛽1 (Distance to MDL)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , where: 0
< Distance to MDL < ℎ
(4)
where H is a particular outcome of interest (tenure choice or home
size) and h is the bandwidth in miles around the MDL used in the
regression. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), I test the
difference between estimated coefficients (αMD − αPA) = 0, as a
measure of the effect of the MID policy change on housing market
outcomes.
The logic behind the regression discontinuity is to estimate the
intercept term at the MDL approaching it from both the north and the
south. The difference in intercepts estimate, (αMD − αPA), allows me to
see if there is a sharp change in housing market outcomes at the point
where the MID policy change happens. I also estimate the regression
discontinuity equations without controlling for distance to the MDL,
these results essentially compare the unconditional mean home size
within a specified bandwidth around the MDL.

5. Data on home size and homeownership
I estimate Eq. (2) using dwelling level data from the 2007
American Housing Survey (AHS). I use the 2007 AHS National survey,
rather than the newer 2009 survey, because it includes dwellings
sampled from the six largest metropolitan areas. For the size of home
regressions, only homes that are owner occupied are used because
renters will not benefit from the MID directly. The ownership
regressions use all homes in the AHS survey.
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The unit of observation in the AHS is the dwelling. The AHS data
consists of householder responses to survey questions on the actual
dwelling and the composition of the occupants of the dwelling. The
homes surveyed in the AHS include a core sample of homes that has
not changed since 1985 and newly constructed dwellings added to the
core annually by sampling addresses from building permits data. The
data contain a wealth of information about the dwelling, including if it
is owner-occupied, and its size measured in square feet- used as
dependent variables in Eq. (2).
The constraint on using the AHS data to estimate Eq. (2) is
knowledge of MID availability across states and time. To identify
whether a state has an MID available in a given year I examine state
tax forms.14 I am able to match state MID policy information for all
states from 2003 to 2007 (the final year of new homes in the AHS),
Table 1 summarizes the state tax information. I use dwellings where
the current resident moved in during the 2003–2007 period, and
match data on MID availability according to the year of move and state
location.
Table 1. State tax summary.

Alabama

Income tax

MID available

Use federal itemized

Yes

Yes

Yes

Alaska

No

No

No

Arizona

Yes

Yes

Yes

Arkansas

Yes

Yes

No

California

Yes

Yes

Yes

Colorado

Yes

Yes

Yes

Connecticut

Yes

No

No

Delaware

Yes

Yes

Yes

District of Columbia

Yes

Yes

Yes

Florida

No

No

No

Georgia

Yes

Yes

Yes

Hawaii

Yes

Yes

No

Idaho

Yes

Yes

Yes

Illinois

Yes

No

No

Indiana

Yes

No

No

Iowa

Yes

Yes

No

Kansas

Yes

Yes

No

Kentucky

Yes

Yes

No

Louisiana

Yes

No

–a
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Income tax

MID available

Use federal itemized

Maine

Yes

Yes

Yes

Maryland

Yes

Yes

Yes

Massachusetts

Yes

No

No

Michigan

Yes

No

No

Minnesota

Yes

Yes

Yes

Mississippi

Yes

Yes

Yes

Missouri

Yes

Yes

Yes

Montana

Yes

Yes

No

Nebraska

Yes

Yes

Yes

Nevada

No

No

No

New

Hampshireb

No

No

No

New Jersey

Yes

No

No

New Mexico

Yes

Yes

Yes

New York

Yes

Yes

Yes

North Carolina

Yes

Yes

Yes

North Dakota

Yes

Yes

Yes

Ohio

Yes

No

No

Oklahoma

Yes

Yes

Yes

Oregon

Yes

Yes

Yes

Pennsylvania

Yes

No

No

Rhode island

Yes

Yes

Yes

South Carolina

Yes

Yes

Yes

South Dakota

No

No

No

Tennesseeb

No

No

No

Texas

No

No

No

Utah

Yes

Yes

Yes

Vermont

Yes

Yes

Yes

Virginia

Yes

Yes

Yes

Washington

No

No

No

West Virginia

Yes

No

No

Wisconsin

Yes

Yes

–c

Wyoming
No
No
No
aBeginning in 2007, Louisiana allowed taxpayers to deduct 57.5% of federal
itemized deductions in excess of the standard deduction.
bNew Hampshire and Tennessee do not tax wages, only interest and dividends;
they are considered to have 0 mtr for this reason.
cWisconsin gives tax payers a credit based on the value of federal itemized
deductions.

The National AHS sample identifies the location of a home at the
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) level. I match the SMSA
to a state to identify MID availability and marginal tax rates; however,
some SMSAs span multiple states. I exclude most multi-state MSAs,
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except New York and Chicago, which the AHS codes to allow
identification of sub-MSA areas (for example New York is separated
into Northern New Jersey and New York plus some of the Long Island
counties). I exclude the following SMSAs from my analysis because I
cannot directly allocate MID and tax rate information to them:
Augusta, GA-SC, Chattanooga, TN-GA, Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN,
Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, IA-IL, Duluth, MN-WI, Johnson CityKingsport-Bristol, TN-VA, Kansas City, KS-MO, Lawrence-Haverhill,
MA-NH, Memphis, TN-AR, MS, Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA-NC, Omaha,
NE-IA, Philadelphia, PA-NJ, Saint Louis, MO-IL, Washington, DC-MDVA (included in the regression discontinuity estimates as state is
identifiable in census data).15
The SMSA identifier in the AHS is also restricted to only identify
homes in an SMSA with a population greater than 100,000, excluding
all homes in smaller SMSAs and homes not in SMSAs. The Appendix
Table shows the counts of homes in my data by SMSA for both the size
and ownership regressions. Using a sample of relatively large SMSAs
and excluding rural areas may be problematic for estimating the effect
of the MID if the excluded homes in MID states are more (less) likely
to be owner occupied or be larger (smaller). This is classic sample
selection based on the exogenous explanatory variable, highlighted in
Wooldridge (2002), and I perform robustness checks accounting for
this problem accordingly. Data constraints leave a sample of 2,315
observations where the home is owner-occupied to estimate the size of
home regressions, and 6,531 observations of owners and renters to
estimate the probability of ownership regressions. Column 1 of Table 2
summarizes the control variables used in estimating (2) for the units in
the sample.
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Table 2. Comparison of observable differences between states with MID and
comparison areas.
(1)

(2)

All owner
occupied
homes

States
with
MID

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

States
States
States
States
without
without with MID, without
MID
MID, With
with
mid, with
Income
income
income
Tax
tax over
tax over
median
median

(7)

(8)

(9)

(2)–
(3)

(2)–
(4)

(5)–
(6)

Top State MTR 5.49 (3.66) 7.94
(1.79)

3.18
(3.65)

5.82
(3.00)

9.28
(0.68)

10.16
(1.48)

4.76
2.12
−0.88
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]

Age of housing 40.77
unit (years)
(24.69)

41.07
(24.67)

40.49
(24.80)

45.03
(26.62)

40.24
(23.69)

53.44
(27.61)

0.58
−3.96 −13.2
[0.57] [0.00] [0.00]

Single family
home

0.74 (.44)

0.73
(0.44)

0.75
(0.43)

0.74
(0.44)

0.71
(0.45)

0.68 (0.47) −0.02 −0.01 0.03
[0.30] [0.51] [0.50]

Annual
maintenance
costs per sq.
ft.

0.57 (1.13) 0.62
(1.35)

0.52
(0.87)

0.56
(0.90)

0.57
(1.02)

0.77 (1.08) 0.1
0.06
−0.2
[0.07] [0.42] [0.06]

Purchase price 0.18 (0.29) 0.23
per sq. ft.
(0.38)
(thousands)

0.13
(0.15)

0.15
(0.18)

0.28
(0.23)

0.26 (0.30) 0.1
0.08
0.02
[0.00] [0.00] [0.43]

Head of
42.26
household age (13.55)

42.41
(14.36)

41.52
(14.70)

42.28
(12.44)

39.31
(13.44)

42.12
(12.64)

−0.29 0.60
2.97
[0.61] [0.36] [0.01]

Non-White
head of
household

0.18 (0.39) 0.20
(0.40)

0.17
(0.38)

0.18
(0.38)

0.21
(0.41)

0.21 (0.41) 0.03
0.02
0.00
[0.09] [0.32] [0.91]

Annual
household
income
(thousands)

97.77
(96.07)

103.90
(101)

92.03
(90.11)

93.11
(84.17)

113.36
(109)

112.38
(91.84)

Home in
central city

0.49 (.50)

0.57
(0.49)

0.42
(0.49)

0.33
(0.47)

0.53
(0.50)

0.20 (0.40) 0.15
0.25
0.33
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]

Mortgage
interest rate

5.73 (1.87) 5.66
(1.90)

5.81
(1.84)

5.70
(1.85)

5.59
(2.08)

5.61 (2.10) −0.15 −0.04 −0.02
[0.08] [0.75] [0.92]

11.87 10.79 0.98
[0.00] [0.02] [0.92]

Standard deviations shown in parenthesis (); p-values shown in brackets [].
Summary statistics are for owner-occupied homes only.
Source: Author calculations using data from 2007 American Housing Survey,
National Sample.

Regression discontinuity equations use census tract-level data
for Maryland and Pennsylvania from the 2000 Census. The census
does not have as detailed information on dwellings as the AHS, but
does offer some measure of the size of homes and if they are owner
Journal of Housing Economics, Vol 21, No. 3 (2012): pg. 195-210. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

15

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

occupied. As a proxy for the size of home, I use the number of rooms
in owner occupied dwellings, reported as the median for each census
tract. To estimate the effect of the MID on home ownership I use the
percentage of owner occupied homes in the census-tract.
I measure the distance to the MDL border for each census tract
in Maryland and Pennsylvania as straight-line distance using ArcGIS
software. To do this, I measure the distance to the border from the
geographic center of the census tract. For the regression discontinuity
equations, I have 7,513 total census tract observations, 3,147 in
Pennsylvania and 1,219 in Maryland. 565 of the census tract
observations are within 50 miles of the state border in Pennsylvania,
and 619 are within 50 miles of the state border in Maryland. The
number of census tracts shrinks considerably using bandwidths less
than 50, there are only 325 tracts within 25 miles of the border, and
only 113 within 10 miles of the border.

6. Results
6.1. State policy results
Table 3 presents the results for estimating Eq. (2) using the
AHS dwelling level data. The first four columns of Table 3 show the
results from a variety of specifications estimating the effect of a state
MID on the size of home (measured in square feet), these regressions
include only data on owner-occupied units as the MID is only available
to home-owners. The last four columns of Table 3 show results from
regressions estimating the effect of the MID on the probability the
occupant is an owner and use both renter and owner occupied units.
Table 3. The effect of the MID on home size and home ownership: state policy
estimates (standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis).
Home size
(1)
**

(2)
**

(3)
*

Home ownership
(4)
**

(5)

(6)

(8)

−0.00748
(0.0213)

−0.0182
(0.0193)

MID
available

214.8
207.3
277.0
(102.1) (98.46) (136.6)

288.0
(135.9)

−0.0326
(0.0340)

Top MTR

−16.93 −15.10 −21.14
(16.60) (16.09) (19.91)

−21.98
(20.18)

−0.00360 −0.00100 −0.00133
(0.00574) (0.00472) (0.00330)

Age of
housing unit
(years)

−33.15***
(7.826)

−33.59***
(7.665)

−0.0498
(0.0312)

(7)

−0.00664***
(0.00112)

−0.000121
(0.00283)
−0.00625***
(0.00106)
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Home size
(1)

(2)

Home ownership

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Age of
housing unit
squared
(years)

0.269***
(0.0767)

0.274***
(0.0753)

3.87e−05***
(1.03e−05)

3.64e−05***
(9.84e−06)

Single family
home

733.2***
(115.1)

736.1***
(116.0)

0.487***
(0.0207)

0.463***
(0.0218)

Annual
maintenance
costs per sq.
ft.

−118.4***
(41.83)

−121.3***
(41.11)

Purchase
price per sq.
ft.
(thousands)

−619.9**
(250.0)

−646.3**
(255.3)

Head of
household
age

48.33*
(23.80)

53.00**
(22.63)

0.00875***
(0.00242)

0.00529**
(0.00230)

Age squared

−0.404
(0.280)

−0.452*
(0.264)

−6.74e−05***
(2.37e−05)

−4.17e−05*
(2.27e−05)

Non-white
head of
household

−153.2*
(85.54)

−146.6*
(85.36)

−0.0678***
(0.0150)

−0.0648***
(0.0139)

Annual
household
income
(thousands)

4.231***
(0.592)

4.221***
(0.588)

0.00128***
(0.000105)

0.00122***
(9.64e−05)

Home in
central city

−196.5***
(64.31)

−199.2***
(63.45)

−0.0353**
(0.0145)

−0.0346**
(0.0142)

Mortgage
interest rate

−2.901
(20.71)

−10.49
(22.10)

Region
dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year of
move
dummies

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations 2315

2315

1480

1480

6531

6531

6363

6363

R-squared

0.007

0.199

0.202

0.003

0.092

0.393

0.419

0.004

Notes: Results are from estimates using the 2007 American Housing Survey
National Sample for households moving into homes from 2003 to 2007.
The omitted region in all regressions controlling for regions is Northeast, the
omitted year in all regressions controlling for year of move is 2003.
Size of home is measured in square feet and these results include only owner
occupied properties.
Ownership estimates cannot control for price, interest rate, or maintenance
costs as these are only available for owners.
***p < 0.01.
**p < 0.05.
*p < 0.1.
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The results presented in Table 3 show a strong positive
relationship between the presence of a state MID and the square
footage of owner occupied homes. The point estimates suggest the
presence of a state MID increases the average size of owner-occupied
homes by between 207 and 288 square feet, or between 10.9% and
15.2% at the sample mean. These results are statistically significant at
either 5% or 10% level depending on the specification. All regressions
in Table 3 control for the census region of the home and cluster
standard errors at the state level.
Results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 control for a variety of
household characteristics that also effect the size of home purchased.
Comparing these results with columns (1) and (2), the point estimates
are somewhat larger when using control variables, but still within one
standard error. All control variables have the expected sign- older
homes are smaller, single family homes are larger, homes with higher
maintenance per square foot are smaller, homes with higher price per
square foot are smaller, older heads of households with more income
purchase larger homes, homes in central cities are smaller, and homes
with a higher mortgage interest rate are smaller.
Table 3 shows the relationship between the presence of a state
MID and the probability a unit is owner-occupied is quite weak. In fact,
point estimates suggest the MID actually decreases the probability a
unit is owner-occupied by as much as 4.9% points. None of the results
estimating the effect of the MID on the probability of homeownership
is statistically different than zero, evidence that the MID does not work
on the extensive margin in the housing market.16 Combined with the
results in columns (1)–(4) these results suggest the MID does not
encourage home ownership, but instead encourages the purchase of a
larger home.
The MID may have a differential effect for houses that are
purchased close to the construction date, as those homes most
accurately capture the optimal housing choice given current market
conditions.17 While this is certainly true, the limited number of
observations (between 140 and 215 homes depending on control
variables) that I am able to match MID availability, year of
construction, and a move in date after 2003 make this estimation less
reliable. I run regressions for the sub-sample of homes that match my
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other data requirements and find the MID coefficient is positive for
homes purchased within 5 years of construction. The magnitude of this
coefficient varies considerably across estimation techniques, however,
and suggests the MID is responsible for an increase in home size
between 84 and 407 square feet. The MID coefficient is not statistically
different than zero for any specification using home purchased within
5 years of construction, likely due to the small sample size.

6.2. Regression discontinuity results
For the regression discontinuity design, estimating (3) and (4) I
use census-tract level data for Maryland and Pennsylvania from the
2000 Census. The top panel of Table 4 shows regression discontinuity
results using the median number of rooms in owner occupied homes
as the dependent variable (a proxy for home size, as square footage is
not available). The bottom panel of Table 4 shows results for a
regression discontinuity using the percent of owner-occupied homes as
the dependent variable. Both panels include estimation controlling for
distance to the MDL, as well as estimates that do not control for
distance.
Table 4. The effect of the MID on home size and ownership: regression
discontinuity estimates (p-value in brackets).
Bandwidth around limit (h)
Full sample 150 miles 100 miles 50 miles 25 miles

10 miles

Size of home
N in PA, N in MD

3147, 1219

2753, 1200 2345, 1109 565, 619 178, 147 53, 60

αMD − αPA

0.24

0.11

0.01

0.32

−0.06

0.02

%Increase from MID

3.65

1.60

0.00

5.00

−0.01

0.01

Ho: αMD − αPA = 0

[0.00]

[0.14]

[0.94]

[0.01]

[0.72]

[0.91]

αMD − αPA (excluding distance) 0.35

0.35

0.34

0.11

0.04

0.02

%Increase from MID

5.43

5.45

5.24

1.73

0.66

0.01

Ho: αMD − αPA = 0

[0.00]

[0.00]

[0.00]

[0.25]

[0.43]

[0.82]

N in PA, N in MD

3131, 1213

2737, 1195 2329, 1104 564, 615 178, 146 53, 60

αMD − αPA

−0.03

−0.02

−0.04

0.04

−0.13

0.06

%Increase from MID

−4.49

−3.88

−5.74

5.75

−15.63

8.08

Ho: αMD − αPA = 0

[0.02]

[0.07]

[0.02]

[0.07]

[0.00]

[0.30]

αMD − αPA (excluding distance) −0.02

−0.02

−0.02

0.01

−0.08

−0.07

Percent owner occupied
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Bandwidth around limit (h)
Full sample 150 miles 100 miles 50 miles 25 miles

10 miles

% Increase from MID

−3.55

−3.37

−3.26

1.58

−10.40

−8.98

Ho: αMD − αPA = 0

[0.00]

[0.00]

[0.00]

[0.56]

[0.00]

[0.02]

Notes: Results in the top panel are reported from regressions that use the
median number of rooms per owner-occupied home in the census tract as the
dependant variable.
Results in the bottom panel are reported from regressions that use the percent
of owner occupied homes in the census tract as the dependant variable.
Source: Author’s calculations using 2000 Census data.

The results in the top panel of Table 4 show a fairly robust
relationship between the presence of the MID and the size of home
purchased by owner–occupants. Using the full sample of census tracts
in each state and controlling for distance to the MDL, the discontinuity
in the median number of rooms is .24 at the state border – a
difference of 3.65% of the sample mean. This says that the MID is
responsible for a 3.65% increase in the median number of rooms in
owner occupied homes. Fig. 3 demonstrates the estimated regression
discontinuity results graphically as a jump in the median size of homes
occurs at the border.

Fig. 3. Regression discontinuity results for effect of MID on median number of
rooms.
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The size and significance of this relationship are strained when
adjusting the bandwidth around border, the relationship becomes
insignificant for samples within 150 and 100 miles of the border when
controlling for distance. Using only census tracts within 50 miles of the
border, the measured discontinuity is strong and shows a statistically
significant increase in home size of .32 rooms when the MID is
available. The .32 room increase from the MID equals a 5% increase in
home size at the sample mean. Tightening the bandwidth to 25 or 10
miles yields statistically insignificant results with extremely small
magnitudes.
The regression discontinuity results that exclude distance
controls all show a positive relationship between the MID and home
size. These results suggest a slightly larger magnitude, and remain
stronger at smaller bandwidths than the results that control for
distance. Using the full sample, the regression discontinuity results
suggest about a 5.4% increase in the median number of rooms, a
result than remains consistent when narrowing the bandwidth to 150
or 100 miles while retaining statistical significance. As with the results
that control for distance, specifications with smaller and smaller
bandwidths lose statistical significance.
The regression discontinuity results in the bottom panel of Table
4 show the MID actually reduces the percent of owner–occupants in
four out of six specifications. These results are more evidence that the
MID does not encourage home-ownership on the margin. The
exceptions to the negative estimates are the results using census
tracts within 50 and 10 miles of the state border, which show a
substantial increase in the percent of owner–occupants, only the 50
mile results is marginally statistically significant, but suggests that the
MID increases the probability of home-ownership by about 5.75% at
the mean.
The regression discontinuity results for homeownership that
exclude distance controls are similar to the results controlling for
distance. These results suggest a negative relationship between the
MID and homeownership that is similar in size to the results controlling
for distance in most specifications, with the primary exception being
the results within 10 miles of the MDL. Results that do not control for
distance suggest a sizable negative relationship between the MID and
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ownership rates that is statistically significant, whereas the results that
control for distance suggest a statistically imprecise positive
relationship.

6.3. Alternative comparison group results
The results using state level policy to identify the effect of the
MID on size of home and home ownership decisions rely on three
primary assumptions. First, homes in states without an MID make a
valid counter-factual for what homes in states with an MID would look
like in the absence of the policy. Second, there are no omitted
variables influencing size and ownership decisions correlated with
availability of the MID. Third, the policy is not endogenous- individuals
with larger homes do not cause states to have an MID.
The summary statistics and corresponding t-tests in Table 2
address the first point to some degree. Column (7) of Table 2 shows
how the group of states with and without the MID differ statistically
along several observed dimensions. Homes in states with a MID are
more likely to be located in a central city, have household heads with
higher incomes, and have a higher price per square foot than homes in
states without an MID. They are also marginally more likely to have
household heads that are non-white, higher annual maintenance costs,
and lower mortgage rates.
The regression results presented in Table 3 control for all
observable factors, however, the observed differences shown in Table
2 suggest that there may be other important differences between
these states that cannot be observed. This possibility suggests homes
in states without an MID do not make an ideal group for creating a
counter-factual. I use two alternative comparison groups to create a
counter-factual for what home size and ownership would look like in
the absence of a state MID. First, I compare states without an MID,
but that have an income tax, to states with an MID (and income tax).
Second, I use only states with a top marginal income tax rate more
than the median in the sample (7.7%), and compare those with and
without a state MID.
Column (8) of Table 2 shows how states with an MID compare
to states without an MID, but with an income tax. Notice that the
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difference in maintenance costs, interest rates, and non-white head of
household are no longer apparent, although differences in purchase
price, income, and central city location remain. Column (9) of Table 2
shows how states with or without MID, but with a top marginal income
tax rate more than the median in the data compare. Using this
comparison group eliminates observed differences income, but
differences in age of the home and householder become stronger.
Table 5 shows estimation results for Eq. (2) using the
alternative comparison groups to estimate the effect of the MID on
home size and homeownership. The results are quite similar to the
primary results shown in Table 3 – the MID is responsible for
increasing the size of home purchased, but not for increasing the
probability a home is owner-occupied.
Table 5. The effect of the MID on home size and home ownership: alternative
control group estimates (standard errors clustered at the state level in
parenthesis).
Home size

Income tax states

(1)
MID
available
Top MTR

(2)

Home ownership

States with MTR
over median
(3)

Income tax states

(4)

(5)

(6)

States with MTR over
median
(7)

(8)

307.7**

322.9**

251.8**

320.9*

−0.0156

−0.0226

−0.0640

−0.0298*

(143.0)

(140.6)

(98.65)

(145.1)

(0.0198)

(0.0195)

(0.0658)

(0.0151)

−13.77

−14.18

23.12

8.334

−0.00208

−0.000142

−0.0371

−0.00401

(24.60)

(24.67)

(33.81)

(60.19)

(0.00518)

(0.00427)

(0.0418)

(0.00660)

Age of
housing unit −37.14*** −37.43*** −31.34*** −30.53**
(years)
(8.058)
Age of
housing unit
0.308***
squared
(years)

(7.947)

(9.081)

(9.309)

(0.00135)

0.312***

0.240∗∗

0.234∗∗

4.16e−05*** 3.91e−05*** 6.11e−05*** 5.74e−05***

(0.0758) (0.0752)
Single family
754.9***
home
(139.0)

−0.00700*** −0.00661*** −0.00867*** −0.00831***
(0.00126)

(0.000542) (0.000672)

(0.0865) (0.0897)

(1.22e−05)

(1.14e−05) (6.33e−06) (7.02e−06)

755.6***

601.6***

606.8***

0.489***

0.468***

0.462***

0.444***

(137.5)

(123.4)

(127.8)

(0.0231)

(0.0244)

(0.0479)

(0.0462)

Annual
maintenance −107.5** −110.9** −73.08*** −73.69***
costs
(40.52)

(40.30)

(7.630)

(7.866)

Purchase
−582.5** −604.9** −1,098*** −1,131***
price per sq.
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Home size

Income tax states

(1)

Home ownership

States with MTR
over median

(2)

(3)

Income tax states

(4)

(5)

States with MTR over
median

(6)

(7)

(8)

ft.
(thousands)
Head of
household
age

(234.9)

(241.1)

(169.4)

(172.8)

36.82

41.61

26.77

35.09

0.00862***

0.00550*

0.0104**

0.00688

(0.00292)

(0.00443)

(0.00448)

(30.13)

(28.37)

(29.73)

(30.63)

(0.00310)

Age squared −0.273

−0.322

−0.0732

−0.154

−6.80e−05** −4.58e−05 −8.80e−05* −6.15e−05

(0.354)

(0.332)

(0.351)

(0.357)

(2.97e−05)

(2.80e−05) (4.05e−05) (4.16e−05)

−140.3

−134.9

−59.00

−42.73

−0.0587***

−0.0548***

−0.0273

−0.0225

(106.5)

(105.5)

(108.2)

(107.0)

(0.0162)

(0.0144)

(0.0177)

(0.0174)

4.124***

2.902***

2.879***

0.00130***

0.00124***

0.00137***

0.00128***

(0.716)

(0.575)

(0.549)

(0.000110)

(9.93e−05) (0.000106) (7.76e−05)

Non-white
head of
household

Annual
household
4.145***
income
(thousands)
(0.719)
Home in
central city

−242.3*** −241.7*** −208.7*** −215.2*** −0.0226**

−0.0236**

−0.00161

−0.00660

(75.78)

(0.0110)

(0.0115)

(0.0149)

(0.0165)

Mortgage
9.739
interest rate

(74.25)

(57.15)

(55.22)

3.000

12.38

8.932

(18.64)

(21.31)

(23.87)

(27.31)

Region
dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year of
move
dummies

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations 1173

1173

497

497

4952

4952

2041

2041

R-squared

0.208

0.242

0.249

0.398

0.423

0.388

0.414

0.205

Notes: The income tax states control group includes all states that have a tax
on wage income.
The states with MTR over median control group includes all states that have a
top marginal income tax rate over 7.7, the median for states that tax wage.
Results are from estimates using the 2007 American Housing Survey National
Sample for households moving into homes from 2003 to 2007.
The omitted region in all regressions controlling for regions is Northeast, the
omitted year in all regressions controlling for year of move is 2003.
Size of home is measured in square feet and includes only owner occupied
properties.
Ownership estimates cannot control for price, interest rate, or maintenance
costs as these are only available for owners.
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.
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Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show results using only homes
in states with an income tax as the comparison group for homes in
states with an income tax and MID. The point estimates suggest the
MID is responsible for between a 307 and 322 square foot increase in
the size of home purchased, larger than the estimates using all homes
as the comparison group. These estimates are equal to between a
16.3% and 17.1% change in the size of home at the mean. The
standard errors on the estimates using only income tax states as a
comparison group are larger than the full sample estimates, but still
small enough to be able to make the estimates statistically significant
at the 5% level.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 show results using only homes
in states with a top marginal income tax rate above the sample
median (7.7%) to estimate the effect of the MID. The point estimates
suggest the MID is responsible for increasing the size of homes
purchased by between 251 and 320 square feet, or between 13.3%
and 17% at the mean. The standard errors on these estimates are
quite small, making the estimates statistically significant at either 5%
or 10% level. The larger point estimates than the primary results using
only state policy variation, suggest that these regressions remove the
direct effects of higher income taxes on consuming more housing, so
they may be a more pure measure of the MID-only effect.
Columns (5–8) of Table 5 show that despite changing the
comparison group the MID continues to have almost no statistically
discernable effect on the probability a home is owner-occupied. The
estimated effect of the MID on homeownership is only marginally
statistically significant (at the 10% level) in one specification, and in
all cases suggests a negative effect on the probability that a home is
owner occupied. The sign and lack of statistical significance for the
effect of the MID on home ownership using the alternative comparison
groups matches the estimates using the full sample of homes.

6.4. Instrumental variables results
The strong link between the MID and size of home and nonexistent link between the MID and home ownership is robust to using
different comparison groups to create a counterfactual for what
housing would look like in the absence of the policy. Two remaining
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concerns – omitted variables bias, and policy endogeneity – can both
be addressed using instrumental variables estimation.18 One could
make the argument that residents who have a strong preference for
consuming housing are more likely to lobby state governments to
allow a state level MID. If this is the case, then it is large homes
causing the state MID – a classic policy endogeneity.
An instrument in this case requires a variable correlated with a
state allowing a deduction for mortgage interest, but only correlated
with home size through its correlation with state MID policy. An
instrument that plausibly meets these criteria is whether the state
uses the federal definition of itemized deductions, thus passively
allowing the MID.19 Using the federal definition of itemized deductions
is arguably uncorrelated with many of the potential sources of omitted
variable bias and reverse causality between the MID and home size
because it implies that the residents of the state did not actively lobby
to get a MID. States that take the federal definition of itemized
deductions allow all federal deductions, not just the MID, so it is
unlikely that having this policy is strongly correlated with resident
preferences for housing consumption. States still actively choose to
allow the federal definition of itemized deductions but this would most
likely be the result of influence from a number of beneficiaries of such
a decision as there are a variety of itemized deductions including for
medical and dental expenses, state and local taxes, gifts to charity,
and business expenses incurred.
The second criterion for an instrument, being correlated with
having a state MID, is an empirical question to be answered by the
first stage regression results. As shown in Table 6, using the federal
definition of itemized deductions is strongly correlated with having a
state MID. This correlation exists when controlling for other variables,
regional dummy variables, year-of-move dummy variables, and
clustering standard errors at the state level. For all specifications, the
instrument F-statistic is above 150, far greater than the typical
accepted value of 10, and in all cases the p-value for this statistic
shows it is significant at less than the 1% level.20
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Table 6. First Stage IV results: instrument for MID with states that use federal
definition of itemized deductions.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.8922***

0.8916***

0.8718***

0.8711***

(0.0674)

(0.0675)

(0 .0110)

(0.0714)

175.37

174.45

150.47

148.9

[0.0000]

[0.0000]

[0.0000]

[0.0000]

Includes other control variables

No

No

Yes

Yes

Census region dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year of move-in dummies

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

2251

2251

1434

1434

Federal definition of itemized
deductions
Instrument F-test

Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
***p < 0.01.

Table 7 presents the 2nd stage instrumental variables results
estimating the effect of the MID on home size and ownership using
states that take the federal definition of itemized deductions as an
instrument for the MID. Columns (1) through (4) show the results
using instrumental variables are quite similar to the primary results
and the results using alternative comparison groups. The instrumental
variables results suggest the MID is responsible for home size
increasing by between 221 and 348 square feet, or between 11.7%
and 18.4% at the sample mean. The IV results using all control
variables are significant at the 5% level; however, the results using no
control variables are only significant at the 10% level. The results
estimating the effect of the MID on homeownership again show no
statistically significant relationship, with negative point estimates as in
the primary results.
Table 7. The effect of the MID on home size and home ownership:
instrumental variables estimates (standard errors clustered at the state level
in parenthesis).
Home size
(1)

(2)

232.3

Top MTR

221.9

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

348.6

−0.0394 −0.0584

−0.0170

−0.0277

(119.4 (118.0
(152.9)
)
)

(151.2)

(0.0381) (0.0346)

(0.0248)

(0.0224)

−21.6 −19.6
−26.96
4
6

−27.58

−0.0032 −0.00050
−0.000774
3
6

*

335.8

(4)
**

*

MID
available

(3)

Home ownership

**

0.000374
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Home size
(1)

(2)

Home ownership

(3)

(19.00 (18.69
(22.50)
)
)

(4)
(22.67)

(5)

(6)

Age of
housing unit
squared
(years)

(8)

(0.00608
(0.00503) (0.00339)
)

−34.31** −34.74**

Age of
housing unit
(years)

(7)

(0.00286)

*

*

−0.00703***

(7.971)

(7.817)

(0.00114)

−0.00661**
*

(0.00109)
3.95e−05**

0.283*** 0.288***

4.21e−05***

(0.0781) (0.0767)

(1.07e−05)

(1.02e−05)

Single
family home

726.3

729.3

0.482

0.458***

(118.1)

(119.4)

(0.0207)

(0.0218)

Annual
maintenanc
e costs

−120.2** −123.3**

Purchase
price per sq.
ft.
(thousands)

−614.5** −644.0**
(244.9)

(250.7)

Head of
household
age

46.26*

50.97**

0.00902***

0.00555**

(24.85)

(23.60)

(0.00246)

***

Age squared

***

*

*

(42.83)

(42.04)

−0.382

−0.432

***

−7.02e−05

*

(0.00235)
**

−4.41e−05

*

*

(0.292)

(0.276)

(2.42e−05)

(2.33e−05)

Non-white
head of
household

−143.7

−135.4

−0.0651***

−0.0625***

(87.83)

(87.27)

(0.0148)

(0.0139)

Annual
household
income
(thousands)

4.272

4.258

0.00127

0.00121***

(0.608)

(0.605)

(0.000105)

(9.62e−05)

***

***

***

−213.9** −215.9**

Home in
central city
Mortgage
interest rate

*

*

−0.0389**

−0.0381**

(66.47)

(65.21)

(0.0145)

(0.0142)

−0.743

−10.16

(21.82)

(23.58)

Region
dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year of
move
dummies

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observation
2251
s

2251

1434

1434

6353

6353

6190

6190

R-squared

0.006

0.199

0.202

0.003

0.093

0.392

0.418

0.003
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Notes: Results are from estimates using the 2007 American Housing Survey
National Sample for households moving into homes from 2003 to 2007.
The omitted region in all regressions controlling for regions is Northeast, the
omitted year in all regressions controlling for year of move is 2003.
Size of home is measured in square feet and includes only owner occupied
properties.
Ownership estimates cannot control for price, interest rate, or maintenance
costs as these are only available for owners.
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.

6.5. Accounting for sample selection
One remaining concern with the primary estimates using the
AHS sample is that I can only identify MID status for homes that are
located in an SMSA with a population greater than 100,000, thus any
homes in more rural areas and small SMSAs are excluded from the
estimation. I start with the sample of 16,785 homes where the
occupant moved in during the 2003–2007 period to match the MID
availability data. From this sample, 7,398 include SMSA information.
Of the 7,398 potential usable homes in the sample about another 800–
1000 are missing data on at least one explanatory variable, size, or
ownership status and do not appear in all regressions. A potential
problem highlighted by the select sample is that it is made up of only
about 35% home owners.21 This section explores using sample
selection techniques to deal with any bias that using a smaller sample
of homeowners that reside in relatively larger SMSAs may cause in the
primary estimates.
The vast majority of sample selection comes from excluding
information on the SMSA, which can be considered as a classic
problem of sample selection based on an exogenous explanatory
variable, detailed in Wooldridge (2002) and first explained by
Heckman (1979). To account of this type of selection, I first estimate
the selection equation to explain SMSA status. The selection equation
is a probit of the following form:

γ = eα + β1 (Floors) + Χβ + Ζ
(5)
where Y is equal to one when SMSA information is known, and zero
otherwise, X represents all control variables from the home size
Journal of Housing Economics, Vol 21, No. 3 (2012): pg. 195-210. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

29

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

equations including: unit age (squared), single family status,
household head age (squared), non-white household head, household
income, and central city status. In addition, the exogenous variable
“Floors” is the height of the building the housing unit resides in
measured by the number of floors. Floors is used as an exogenous
variable to explain SMSA status, and is excluded from primary
estimation. Although using building height is not randomly assigned, it
meets the condition of being correlated with SMSA status, and is
arguably orthogonal to anything unobservable in the ownership or size
regressions. I use the coefficients from Eq. (5) to create predicted
probabilities that a home is in the sample, also known as the inverse
Mills ratio. These predicted probabilities, λ, are then used in the
primary estimating equation to control for sample selection. The
estimating equation with the selection correction becomes:

𝛾𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (MID)𝑖 + 𝛽2 (Top MTR)𝑖 + 𝛽3 (𝜆) + Ζ𝑖ˊ 𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖
(6)
Table 8 shows the results of estimating Eq. (6), both with OLS
and also treating MID as endogenous and using IV. These results again
confirm what the previous estimation techniques showed – the MID is
associated with larger homes in a statistically meaningful way, but is
not related to homeownership rates. The magnitude of the selection
corrected estimates is in the middle of the OLS and IV estimates, and
suggests the MID is responsible for increasing home size by between
273 and 314 square feet, or between 14.5% and 16.6% at the sample
mean.
Table 8. The effect of the MID on home size and home ownership: sample
selection corrected estimates (standard errors clustered at the state level in
parenthesis).
Home size
(1)

(2)

(3)

Home ownership
(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

MID Available 273.1**

299.8**

280.5**

314.7*

−0.00621 −0.0176

−0.0197

−0.0278

(110.9)

(139.6)

(124.5)

(156.0)

(0.0227)

(0.0239)

(0.0221)

−19.65

−24.29

−23.80

−22.97

−0.00462 −0.000164

−0.00358 0.000386

(17.44)

(20.82)

(19.84)

(23.16)

(0.00410) (0.00281)

(0.00429) (0.00284)

−0.496*** 0.377

−0.505*** 0.0144

Top MTR
Sample
selection
parameter

−804.4** 8,610***

−792.9** 4,970***

(0.0193)
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Home size
(1)
(303.0)
Age of
housing unit
(years)
Age of
housing unit
squared
(years)
Single family
home

(2)

Purchase
price per sq.
ft.
(thousands)
Head of
household
age
Age squared
Non-white
head of
household
Annual
household
income
(thousands)

(3)

(2,545)

(313.3)

Region
dummies

(0.0510)

(6)
(0.363)

(7)
(0.0476)

(8)
(0.0826)

−0.0127**

−0.00685***

(45.64)

(23.94)

(0.00579)

(0.00197)

1.627***

1.069***

9.50e−05*

4.17e−05**

(0.409)

(0.210)

(5.18e−05)

(1.85e−05)

***

1,441

***

(345.6)

(158.9)

−119.0***

−117.6**

(42.19)

(43.91)

−654.4**

−709.1**

(252.7)

(259.1)

19.20

0.512

***

0.460***

(0.0541)

(0.0236)

30.74

0.00407**

0.00550**

(20.66)

(25.07)

(0.00198)

(0.00240)

−0.0440

−0.184

−2.64e−05

−4.36e−05∗

(0.249)

(0.303)

(1.89e−05)

(2.38e−05)

−593.9***

−387.5***

−0.0844***

−0.0632***

(174.8)

(126.6)

(0.0191)

(0.0140)

−1.988

0.780

0.000953***

0.00120***

(0.000323)

(9.93e−05)

−0.182

−0.0437

(0.140)

(0.0371)

−3.554

Mortgage
interest rate

(1,550)

(5)

−120.6***

(1.737)
Home in
central city

(4)

−182.5***

1,895

Annual
maintenance
costs per sq.
ft.

Home ownership

(1.252)

***

−2.130

***

(998.8)

(593.0)

−10.66

−3.977

(21.69)

(21.71)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year of move
Yes
dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations 2284

1480

2223

1434

6363

6363

6190

6190

R-squared

0.213

0.016

0.214

0.143

0.419

0.146

0.418

0.017
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Results are from estimates using the 2007 American Housing Survey National
Sample for households moving into homes from 2003 to 2007.
The omitted region in all regressions controlling for regions is Northeast, the
omitted year in all regressions controlling for year of move is 2003.
Size of home is measured in square feet and these results include only owner
occupied properties.
Ownership estimates cannot control for price, interest rate, or maintenance
costs as these are only available for owners.
The sample selection variable is the predicted probability that a home is in an
SMSA using the age, single family status, head of household, race of
household head, income, and central city status as explanatory variables,
estimated using the full AHS sample. This equation uses building height of the
residence measured in floors as the exogenous variation in selection. Columns
(3), (4), (7), and (8) treat MID as endogenous and estimate with instrumental
variables, while (1), (2), (5), and (6) estimate with OLS.
***p < 0.01.
**p < 0.05.
*p < 0.1.

7. Conclusion
This paper uses differences in state level policy to estimate the
effect of mortgage interest deductibility on homeownership and size of
home purchased. Empirical estimates suggest the MID is responsible
for a 10.9–18.4% increase in the size of home purchased, but that it is
not correlated with home ownership. The size of these point estimates
depend on the comparison group and estimation technique.
The size of the estimates suggests that a state level MID
induces about an additional 300 square feet of housing purchase, or
about an average size room for owner occupied homes in the American
Housing Survey. Applying the user cost model of housing to a state
with the median top marginal income tax rate, the MID reduces annual
user cost of homeownership by about 11%.22 The user cost figure
implies an elasticity of housing purchase on the intensive margin of
between −1 and −1.4 using the OLS point estimates, so that an
increase in user cost by 1% reduces housing purchase on the intensive
margin by between 1% and 1.4%.
Although the results presented here generally suggest no
meaningful relationship between the MID and homeownership, the OLS
and IV point estimates are negative, and the RD point estimates are
negative and in many cases statistically meaningful. One possible
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explanation for a negative relationship between the MID and
homeownership rates is that the MID drives up home prices for
everyone, while a much smaller number actually claim the deduction
and receive the subsidy (only about one third of tax filers claim the
MID). Susin (2002) proposes a similar story for the Section 8 housing
voucher subsidy, finding that subsidized renters driving up prices hurt
renters who do not receive the subsidy.
These findings offer empirical evidence that the tax treatment of
owner-occupied housing increases the amount of housing consumption
along a similar magnitude as the parameterized theoretical models of
Mills, 1987 and Poterba, 1992. The empirical evidence presented here
suggests the MID causes increased consumption of housing on the
intensive (larger home) rather than extensive (more home owners)
margin.
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Appendix A. Sample size by SMSA used in regressions
SMSA

Ownership regressions Home size regressions

Akron, OHu

23

7

Albany, NY

25

8

Albuquerque, NM

35

11

Allentown, PA

28

6

Alton, IL

3

0

Anaheim, CA

130

42

Appleton, WI

9

2

Atlanta, GA

143

39

Atlantic City, NJ

3

3

Aurora, IL

17

9

Austin, TX

64

19

Bakersfield, CA

30

18

Baltimore, MD

105

44

Baton Rouge, LA

22

8

Journal of Housing Economics, Vol 21, No. 3 (2012): pg. 195-210. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

33

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.
SMSA

Ownership regressions Home size regressions

Beaumont, TX

6

4

Beaver, PA

5

3

Bergen, NJ

48

19

Birmingham, AL

36

14

Boston, MA

133

55

Boulder, CO

16

4

Bridgeport, CT

18

9

Canton, OH

17

7

Charleston, SC

12

3

Chicago, IL

305

101

Cleveland, OH

69

21

Colorado Springs, CO

24

9

Columbia, SC

19

6

Columbus, OH

85

28

Corpus Christi, TX

19

5

Dallas, TX

172

46

Daytona Beach, FL

4

1

Denver, CO

51

17

Des Moines, IA

15

7

Detroit, MI

175

80

East Saint Louis, IL

5

0

El Paso, TX

33

17

Erie, PA

3

0

Eugene, OR

11

1

Flint, MI

14

5

Fort Lauderdale, FL

92

37

Fort Myers, FL

4

1

Fort Wayne, IN

12

5

Fort Worth, TX

89

36

Fresno, CA

29

8

Gary, IN

21

7

Grand Rapids, MI

28

11

Greensboro, NC

33

10

Greenville, SC

12

6

Hartford, CT

11

1

Honolulu, HI

27

11

Houston, TX

170

50

Indianapolis, IN

69

22

Jackson, MS

11

4

Jacksonville, FL

55

21

Jersey City, NJ

36

4

Knoxville, TN

25

7
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SMSA

Ownership regressions Home size regressions

Lake County, IL

25

15

Lakeland, FL

7

4

Lancaster, PA

7

4

Lansing, MI

7

2

Las Vegas, NV

75

31

Lexington, KY

28

7

Little Rock, AK

20

10

Los Angeles, CA

415

108

Madison, WI

19

6

McAllen, TX

21

6

Melbourne, FL

12

4

Miami, FL

113

39

Middlesex, NJ

35

17

Milwaukee, WI

72

27

Minneapolis, MN

122

47

Mobile, AL

11

2

Modesto, CA

13

4

Monmouth, NJ

24

12

Montgomery, AL

8

3

Nashville, TN

53

16

Nassau-Suffolk, NY

74

46

New Haven, CT

19

9

New Orleans, LA

46

14

New York, NY

450

100

Newark, NJ

83

24

Oakland, CA

119

49

Oklahoma City, OK

72

23

Orlando, FL

61

26

Oxnard, CA

29

11

Pensacola, FL

8

2

Peoria, IL

14

3

Phoenix, AZ

182

94

Pittsburgh, PA

77

26

Providence, RI

26

9

Raleigh, NC

50

16

Riverside, CA

88

34

Rochester, NY

38

14

Rockford, IL

5

3

Sacramento, CA

89

28

Salem, MA

8

4

Salinas, CA

12

3

Salt Lake City, UT

70

30
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SMSA

Ownership regressions Home size regressions

San Antonio, TX

64

14

San Diego, CA

157

54

San Francisco, CA

91

26

San Jose, CA

86

30

Santa Barbara, CA

14

3

Santa Rosa, CA

15

5

Sarasota, FL

6

5

Scranton, PA

16

5

Seattle, WA

108

42

Shreveport, LA

10

7

Spokane, WA

17

9

Springfield, MA

29

6

Stamford, CT

10

4

Stockton, CA

26

8

Syracuse, NY

18

2

Tacoma, WA

34

10

Tampa, FL

94

39

Toledo, OH

26

9

Trenton, NJ

7

4

Tucson, AZ

44

15

Tulsa, OK

29

5

Utica, NY

3

1

Vallejo, CA

15

9

Waterbury, CT

6

3

West Palm Beach, FL

45

22

Wichita, KS

23

7

Worcester, MA

8

6

Youngstown, OH

15

7

Chicago Areas (Joliet, Lake)

49

38

New York Areas (Nassau, Suffolk, New
York)

23

16

Northern New Jersey

80

53

Notes: Sample counts are from 2007 American Housing Survey for households
moving into homes from 2003 to 2007. Counts for units in ownership regressions
include all units in the sample where MID is identified by matching the SMSA to a
state. Counts for units in size regressions include all units in the sample where MID is
identified by matching the SMSA to a state and the unit is owner occupied. The sample
excludes the following multi-state SMSAs: Augusta, GA-SC, Chattanooga, TN-GA,
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN, Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, IA-IL, Duluth, MN-WI, Johnson
City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA, Kansas City, KS-MO, Lawrence-Haverhill, MA-NH,
Memphis, TN-AR, MS, Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA-NC, Omaha, NE-IA, Philadelphia, PANJ, Saint Louis, MO-IL, Washington, DC-MD-VA.
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1
Critics also point out that because the value of the MID increases with
a taxpayers marginal tax rate (and thus income), the MID
creates a larger subsidy to those who are less likely to be on the
margin between owning and renting a home. Another criticism
of the MID is that it contributes to urban sprawl, Voith and
Gyourko (2002) present a theoretical model showing that under
reasonable conditions the MID causes relatively wealthy
households to locate further from the city center while keeping
the poor closer to the urban core.
2
These models include both the MID and deduction for property taxes
paid. The primary reason the MID is considered a subsidy is
because the imputed rental value of housing is not considered
income (and taxed).
3
Poterba (1992) offers a range of estimates between 12% and 23%
that vary based on the income (tax bracket) of taxpayers for the
federal tax system after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Mills
(1987) offers a point estimate of 24% based on the entire US
capital stock of housing.
4
Empirical evidence on whether the MID causes additional housing
purchase focuses on the decision to own or rent, and the
demand for mortgage debt.
5
The focus of this analysis is on the mortgage interest deduction, for a
study (and references to previous studies) that focuses on a
broader range of economic and demographic determinants of
home ownership see Coulson (2002).
6
See Rosen (1985) and Smith et al. (1986) for a review of the early
literature on the link between homeownership and the MID.
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Only one state, Louisiana, changes MID policy in the years of my
sample. The small number of observations (68) available in the
AHS for this state makes using a difference-in-difference
estimation technique unattractive.
8
A similar issue arises when choosing the control variables to use in
estimating the relationship between the MID and home purchase
decisions. Many attractive control variables are correlated with
choosing to claim the MID. Of particular concern is an
individual’s marginal tax rate. I adopt the strategy of using a
proxy (the top marginal tax rate in the state), outlined in
Angrist and Pischke (2009), to avoid undue bias on the
coefficient of interest.
9
As an alternative to Eq. (2), I tried a specification that interacts the
MID indicator and the Top MTR variable. This interaction term
represents the combined negative income effect of a higher tax
burden and the positive price effect of making housing relatively
cheaper. In these regressions, the negative income effect
dominates and the coefficient on the interaction term is
negative. This says that on the margin, the tax rate that applies
to the deduction is not as important as the presence of the
deduction.
10
Negative bias would result if housing is a normal good, as lower after
tax income would reduce demand for housing and having an
MID is positively correlated with an income tax.
11
Although the Mason-Dixon Line is famous for marking the division
between northern and southern states in the American Civil
War, it was originally surveyed between 1763 and 1784 to settle
a property rights dispute between two prominent land owners,
the Calverts of Maryland and the Penns of Pennsylvania
(Danson, 2001).
12
According to personal conversations with administrators at the
Pennsylvania Department of Revenue, taxpayers may have
believed a deduction for mortgage interest existed for a brief
time in 1971, although it never actually did. This is because the
original Pennsylvania income tax intended to use federal taxable
income as a base (and thus allow all federal deductions). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court over-turned this idea in the
Amidon v. Kane decision for being in violation of the uniformity
clause in the state constitution by creating different effective
7
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rates for taxpayers with equal gross incomes. After the tax was
passed in March, 1971 but before the Amidon v. Kane decision
was final in August, 1971 taxpayers may have erroneously
believed an MID would be available.
13
Under the original income tax law, Maryland explicitly allowed the
deduction of any interest paid during the tax year (Article 81, §
244 of the Annotated Code of Maryland of 1939–1980),
Maryland State Tax Form 502: 1980–2007). In 1967, Maryland
changed their tax code to allow taxpayers to take all federal
deductions at the state level, excluding those for state and local
taxes (Article 81, § 281 of the Annotated Code of Maryland of
1967).
14
State’s prior year tax forms are typically available through the state
treasury or department of revenue websites. Some states post
state tax forms going back decades, while others only post the
previous few years.
15
As a robustness check, I do a separate analysis that includes the
multi-state SMSA’s where the presence of the MID is consistent
across states in the SMSA. For example, both Iowa and
Nebraska have a state MID, so Omaha would be included in the
robustness check and coded to have a MID, but Georgia has an
MID and Tennessee does not so Chattanooga would be left out
of the robustness check. For this robustness check, I code the
state marginal tax rate according to the top rate in the state
where the majority of SMSA residents live, even though state
tax rates vary widely. The magnitude of the point estimates
shown here is somewhat sensitive to including these additional
SMSAs in the analysis, with the coefficient on the MID variable
suggesting home size increases by about 15% less than the
primary results; however in no case can I reject the null
hypothesis that the point estimates in this sample are equal to
the primary results.
16
To see if the large standard errors in these estimates are driven by a
heterogeneous impact of the MID on home ownership across
groups that are more or less likely to be on the margin between
owning and renting I estimated (2) separately by age and race
groups. These estimates show the same negative and
statistically insignificant relationship as the full sample.
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I would like to thank a particularly helpful referee for pointing out
that because the MID has been in place for a long time without
changes in most states, it is likely that the size of all homes has
been optimized with respect to this large tax incentive, so
finding an effect on all homes is meaningful.
18
Results of a Hausman (1978) test do not indicate a concern for
endogeneity in any of the primary regressions. This test shows
that the predicted error term from a regression explaining MID
availability is not statistically different than zero in a regression
explaining either the square footage of a housing unit or owner
occupancy. This is true when regressions use either no controls
or the full set of controls described as matrix Z. Given that the
Hausman test is typically seen as a weak test because the null
hypothesis is that the predicted error term is zero (no
endogeneity exists), it seems reasonable to proceed with IV
estimation as a precaution.
19
Specifically, I use whether the state starts with the federal definition
of itemized deductions to calculate state itemized deductions.
Most states that start with the federal definition of itemized
deductions allow taxpayers to use all federal itemized
deductions except state and local taxes paid. Some states add
on other itemized deductions that are not allowed at the federal
level.
20
The instrument also performs well against more rigorous testing
using the ivreg2 command in Stata. These tests suggest that
the correlation between the instrument and MID availability is
strong enough to be relevant (the under-identification test) and
strong enough not to cause severe bias (the weak-identification
test).
21
In the fourth quarter of 2011, the US homeownership rate was 66%
according to the US Census Current Population Survey/Housing
Vacancy Survey.
22
This figure is for a 6.5% mortgage, for a taxpayer with a 25%
marginal federal tax rate, with 1% annual maintenance costs,
1% annual property taxes, and 2.5% net appreciation.
17
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